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THE MINIMAL ROLE OF FEDERALISM
AND STATE LAW IN ARBITRATION
Edward Brunet*
One of arbitration doctrine’s greatest anomalies is the narrow, subordinate
role presently played by state arbitration laws.  Put simply, the Supreme Court
has shaped a Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) that routinely trumps state laws
dealing with arbitration and created a situation in which applications of state
arbitration law are the exception.1  No matter that “arbitration is the creature of
contract”2 and that federalism principles call for great sensitivity toward state
policies in the contract realm.  No matter that state and federal arbitration laws
appear to be procedural.  No matter that state arbitration legislation regulates
contracts and consumer transactions, traditionally subject matter left to the state
police powers.  As articulated by the Supreme Court’s anti-state law opinions
in Southland v. Keating,3 Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,4 and Green
Tree Financial Corp. v Bazzle,5 federal law has been permitted to run rough-
shod over the subtleties of state efforts to regulate aspects of arbitration.  With
only the strident voice of Justice Thomas in consistent objection,6 a Supreme
Court, supposedly in the midst of enhanced emphasis of federalism values,7 has
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1 See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006)
(criticizing Supreme Court preemption decisions regarding arbitration as intruding on state
powers); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004)
(chronicling rise of federal arbitration law and diminished power of the states in the regula-
tion of arbitration and criticizing Supreme Court’s inattention to federalism policies).
2 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) (asserting that “arbitration is a matter of contract”); Stephen J. Ware, Default
Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703,
709 n.17 (1999) (noting 177 cases found that used the phrase “arbitration is the creature of
contract”).  A Westlaw search on May 3, 2007, revealed a whopping 390 state and federal
cases using the phrase “arbitration is the creature of contract.”
3 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
4 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
5 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
6 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (setting forth position and supporting reasoning that the FAA does not apply in state
courts).  Justice Thomas continues to adhere to this position. See, e.g., Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bazzle, 539
U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7 See David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism With Federalism:  If It’s Not Just a Battle
Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2081 (2006)
(referring to a “recent federalism revival”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths
of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002) (refer-
ring to a “federalism revolution” and a “pro-federalism majority” of the Supreme Court);
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created an arbitration framework in which state arbitration law occupies a
decidedly secondary role.  Federalism policies are inexplicably ignored in the
present set of arbitration decisions and, sadly, the word “federalism” fails to
appear in any major arbitration preemption majority opinion.8
This Essay will focus on how the present lowly status of state arbitration
law evolved and evaluate whether it seriously undermines important federalism
policies.  In this Essay, I emphasize several reasons that explain the weakened
status of state arbitration law.  Part I traces and critiques the set of cases dealing
with federal arbitration preemption of state arbitration law.  It will be clear that
I regard the set of Supreme Court arbitration decisions to create an atrophied
role for state arbitration regulation, to ignore respected, long-standing tenets of
federalism, and to use a strange, unorthodox mode of preemption analysis
almost preordained to overwhelm state arbitration law.
The second reason for the weakened status of state arbitration law and
policy regards the set of cases expanding power of the arbitrator to decide par-
ticular legal issues in the course of arbitration.  Although these arbitrability
decisions advance the significant policy of party autonomy,9 they diminish the
power of state law, even in areas such as contracts, historically left to the states
as a matter of federalism.  Here, as well as in ordinary preemption contexts,
federal arbitration policy has been allowed to trump state laws that normally
form the subject of federalism deference.
At the same time, the theme of both Volt and Mastrobuono places broad
authority in the parties’ hands to select their own procedural rules that govern
arbitration.  Because the parties may select state law, state law application can
occur in a “backdoor” fashion, through party selection rather than by regula-
tion.10  While some commentators perceive this opt-in process as a way to jus-
tify state arbitration laws,11 the difficulty and inherent obscurity of the opt-in
process will mean that only the most knowledgeable future disputants know of
such an opportunity to select state law.  The third reason that state arbitration
law occupies a secondary role is its narrow application to only intrastate com-
merce.  The broad Breyer interpretation of the FAA’s jurisdictional sweep in
Denise C. Morgan, Introduction:  A Tale of (at Least) Two Federalisms, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 615, 615 (2006) (asserting that “the U.S. Supreme Court has breathed life into” federal-
ism); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004) (concluding that the “‘Federalist Revival’ is now a decade old”).
8 The only arbitration opinion that uses the word federalism is Justice Thomas’ dissent,
joined by Justice Scalia, in Dobson, 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the Court should “resolve the uncertainty [regarding the scope of the FAA] in light of core
principles of federalism”).
9 See EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3-7 (2006) (emphasizing that
party autonomy is the most important policy underlying arbitration).
10 See id. at 74-79 (characterizing party selection of state law as a “back door” way to
activate state law); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism:  A State
Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 211 (2002) (setting forth a positive
vision of state arbitration laws, one of “great potential” and noting that parties may opt in to
application of state laws).
11 See generally Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 10; Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemp-
tion and Vacatur:  The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J.
DISP. RESOL. 67.
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the Terminix decision effectively limited state arbitration law to a narrow
ambit.12  I conclude that if we were starting afresh, a broad, “affecting inter-
state commerce” approach would be entirely defensible.  Nevertheless, because
efforts to amend the Federal Arbitration Act appear doomed to predictable fail-
ure, I argue for some greater interim deference toward state laws that purport to
regulate arbitration.
I. HOW MISGUIDED FEDERAL PREEMPTION TRUMPS
PRO-ARBITRATION STATE LAWS
A. A Brief Review of Preemption Doctrine
In order to understand the wrongheaded nature of the Supreme Court’s
arbitration preemption decisions, it is essential to review preemption methodol-
ogy generally.
Arbitration preemption should be identical to any other form of federal
preemption.  Rather than look for mere differences in state and federal law,
courts should look for suspect state laws that prevent the fulfillment of the core
policies underlying federal arbitration law.  True incompatibility or conflict
between state and federal law is essential to strike down state law on implied
preemption grounds.13  As ably articulated by Professor Caleb Nelson, “pre-
emption occurs if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule established by
federal law . . . .”14
The proper test for evaluating the potential preemption of state arbitration
laws mirrors the typical approach to constitutional preemption questions.  The
court should try to identify serious conflicts between state and federal arbitra-
tion laws.  In the words of Professor Laurence H. Tribe, preemption analysis
involves a search for “actual conflict” to determine if the “federal and state
enactments are directly and facially contradictory.”15  This type of potential
preemption question has been labeled “conflict preemption.”16  The nature of
the conflict between state and federal law need not be textual or literal; the laws
do not need to be “contradictory on their face.”17  Preemption can occur where
state laws conflict with “the precise objectives that underlie” federal law.18
12 Dobson, 513 U.S. at 282 (holding that a lowly termite crawling in Birmingham, Alabama,
is in interstate commerce, thereby triggering the substantive powers of the FAA).
13 It is clear that there is no intent behind federal law to preempt the arbitration field; field
preemption is inapplicable.
14 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231 (2000) (criticizing existing preemp-
tion cases as overly broad and ambiguous).
15 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-29, at 1179 (3d ed. 2000).
Professor Tribe cites and quotes from Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (holding
that state law is preempted when federal law “is in actual conflict with the law of the State”).
Accord Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (stating that preemption
applies when “state law is in actual conflict with federal law”).
16 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 329 (15th ed.
2004).
17 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1181.
18 Id.
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Preemption analysis mandates strict focus upon the policies and goals
underlying federal law.19  Once a conflict between state and federal law
appears, conflicting policies need to be identified and fully vetted to assure that
an apparent conflict is real.  Attention to both federal and state law is essential;
there cannot be a fatal conflict unless the policies behind the two laws are truly
contradictory.  Professor Tribe emphasizes the need for careful inquiry into pol-
icies when he asserts that “the Court has come to uphold state regulations that
supplement federal efforts so long as compliance with the letter or effectuation
of the purpose of the federal enactment is not likely to be significantly impeded
by state law.”20  He urges deference toward state law unless “compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”21  Tribe also
identifies widespread use of “obstacle preemption,” a judicial inquiry as to
whether the application of state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”22
Professor Christopher Drahozal’s helpful study of arbitration preemption
stresses that “[m]ost implied preemption cases involve obstacle preemption.”23
An obstacle preemption test is ordinary and to be expected.  Drahozal also
posits that subjects that are traditionally occupied by the states warrant a pre-
sumption against preemption and asserts that “[c]ontract law certainly would be
an area that states have ‘traditionally occupied,’” thereby triggering a presump-
tion against preemption.24
The obstacle test, although ambiguous and far from ideal, is alive and well
in modern preemption decisions.  For example, in Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council25 the Supreme Court used the obstacle test to find Massachu-
setts’ Burma Law, legislation that narrowed the ability of the state to trade with
companies that did business with Myanmar, preempted by federal law.  The
Court reasoned that the Burma law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress’s full objectives under” federal law.26  Necessarily included in appli-
cation of the obstacle test was consideration of congressional intent in order to
evaluate the potentially conflicting purposes behind federal law.27  Similarly,
Justice Stevens used the obstacle test in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.28  The
decision concluded that state common law tort claims alleging that boat engines
should have been equipped with propeller guards were not preempted by the
Federal Boat Safety Act.  In rejecting the argument that the state law was an
19 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397
(2004) (stating that preemption “depends on congressional intent” and quoting Retail Clerks
International Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (“The purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”)).
20 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-30, at 1195-96.
21 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
22 1 TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-28, at 1176 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
23 Drahozal, supra note 19, at 398.
24 Id.
25 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
26 Id. at 373.
27 Id. at 375-78 (identifying goals supporting federal law and analyzing whether these pur-
poses truly conflict with state law).
28 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
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obstacle to the policies underlying federal law, the Sprietsma opinion focused
on the “main goals” of the federal legislation, promoting boating safety and
achieving uniformity in boat manufacturing.29
Some preemption decisions include federalism policies in the mix of fac-
tors relevant to applying the obstacle test.  Where Congress legislates “in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied . . . [,] we start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”30
Justice Stevens has emphasized that “[o]ur presumption against pre-emption is
rooted in the concept of federalism.”31
This mini-review of preemption doctrine and methodology yields several
conclusions.  We should anticipate that a court, confronted with a state statute
that is allegedly preempted by the FAA, would apply the obstacle approach.  In
addition, federalism policies should be employed in the preemption analysis to
trigger a presumption against preemption because state regulation of contracts,
the general subject matter of arbitration clauses, is traditionally left to state
regulation.  As the following discussion demonstrates, however, these conclu-
sions have been largely ignored by the Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions.
B. A Brief and Intentionally Superficial Review of Federalism Policies:  On
Innovation, Deference, Comity, Cooperation, and Dignity
This all too brief subsection offers a succinct review of federalism policies
that facilitates the subsequent analysis of preemption cases.  While federalism
is a value that seemingly should lack the contours of the rule of law, its subtle
policies are significant and merit careful focus because of the huge potential
impact of federalism values.
At the heart of federalism lies respect for the states or for a shared system
of dual governance between the state and federal government.32  Although this
respect applies readily in the legislative process where elected representatives
of Congress may defer passing federal laws out of respect for state competence
or values, federalism applies as well in the judicial branch where Supremacy
Clause interpretations often trigger examination of federalism values and
tenets.
Federalism’s lack of rule-based content makes it a subtle and sometimes
vague concept.  A decision can articulate great respect for state laws and then
apply federal law.  Judicial applications of federalism do not necessarily
achieve a right-wrong result.  Federalism can be a process of showing aware-
ness of the value of state laws and policies.  Indeed, commentators have long
29 Id. at 69-70.  For other modern uses of the obstacle methodology, see, e.g., Pharmaceuti-
cal Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 658-60 (2003)
(affirming reversal of trial court use of obstacle test) and United States v. Locke, 529 U.S.
89, 107 (2000) (holding Washington oil tanker regulations to be preempted under obstacle
approach).
30 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
31 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (noting
that “[d]ual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional blueprint”).
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analogized federalism to due process by suggesting that federalism “should
operate basically as a due process clause for state geographical units.”33
Deference to state law is part of a robust conception of federalism.  Defer-
ence embraces a degree of self restraint, a reluctance to apply federal law auto-
matically or summarily.  Deference to state law facilitates the autonomy of
state lawmakers to forge new ground and to act independently.34
There are times when adherence to federalism values forms a foundation
for federal-state cooperation or collaboration.  A federal law may provide state
funding if certain conditions, dictated by federal legislation or federal agency
rule, are met.35  Mutual respect between sovereign powers triggers a collabora-
tive, interactive process in this vision of federalism.36  Expertise or funding
abilities can serve as a basis for the cooperation between states and the federal
government.
Comity is also central to federalism.  Comity involves respect for the laws
of another sovereign power; it operates state to state.  Comity also demonstrates
a degree of deference as well as prudential discretion.
Dignity is also a value relevant to federalism.  When state policies are
ignored without consideration, the dignity central to a shared system of govern-
ance in a federal system suffers.  Federalism needs relative parity among sover-
eigns to achieve the advantages of an effective federal, dual-sovereign
system.37  Federal-state parity is difficult to achieve without each sovereign
exhibiting dignity toward the laws and policies of the other.
In an arbitration system of interactive federalism, one would expect to see
these federalism values explicitly set forth and discussed in cases involving
preemption issues.  State arbitration law predates the FAA and holds great
potential value.  State arbitration laws provide a laboratory for experimentation
in developing new arbitration laws.  For example, the detailed provisions of the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act relating to arbitrator disclosure give real con-
tent when compared with the vague disclosure norms of the FAA.38  Comity
and respect are also concepts that one would anticipate being at the core of
cases dealing with possible arbitration preemption issues.  The fact that state
arbitration laws often regulate contracts and consumer laws, fields historically
left for state regulation, would seemingly guarantee some mention of deference,
comity, and mutual respect between dual sovereigns.
A study of cases dealing with arbitration preemption should unearth rich
decisional consideration of the federalism tenets set forth in this subsection.  As
33 Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 459 (1938).
34 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (listing several virtues of federalism
including innovation, experimentation, decentralization, and enhanced citizen involvement).
35 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000) (permitting states to spend federal money to pursue
environmental clean-up goals of federal law).
36 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243 (2005) (describing the death of a system of dual federalism with rigid boundaries
and, instead, the promise of interactive federalism characterized by interconnected and over-
lapping federal and state powers).
37 See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (observing that
states “entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact”).
38 See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (revised 2000).
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the following section shows, however, the leading arbitration federalism deci-
sions offer scant attention to such principles.
C. Abandonment of the Obstacle Test in Arbitration Preemption:
Contrasting Volt and Casarotto and Southland
While the Supreme Court has decided numerous preemption cases involv-
ing arbitration, three decisions, Southland, Volt, and Casarotto, stand as the
leading cases on arbitration methodology.  Deconstruction of these cases, how-
ever, yields a surprisingly strange set of conclusions that appears to defy ortho-
dox conceptions of preemption and federalism.
Southland v. Keating is a landmark decision that preempted state franchise
law while somehow mislabeling a system of federal arbitration procedure as a
substantive regulatory scheme.  Professors Margaret Moses and David
Schwartz have rightly criticized Southland’s law of sensitivity toward the clear
lack of preemptive intent inherent in the FAA.39  The Southland decision inac-
curately structured federal-state relations in arbitration to make preemption of
state arbitration laws a very real possibility and opened the doors of state and
federal courts for subsequent preemption attacks of state laws.  Most impor-
tantly, Southland worked its sea-change without full consideration that federal-
ism was a legitimate issue; the majority opinion ignored the federalism
principles set forth in the earlier subsection of this Essay.
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion summarily found that the Califor-
nia Franchise Investment Law, which, as interpreted by the California Supreme
Court, mandated judicial consideration of the legislation, was preempted.  A
coherent preemption methodology was missing from Southland’s blockbuster
holding.  The majority opinion simply characterized the California law as
undercutting the enforceability of arbitration agreements and, wham, the deed
was done; preemption applied.40  Missing from the Southland analysis was any
reference to the presumption against preemption triggered by traditional use of
state law and regulation.  The importance of the historic regulation of franchis-
ing by the states failed to register with Chief Justice Burger.
In great contrast, Justices Stevens and O’Connor correctly understood the
federalism consequences at stake in Southland.  Justice O’Connor’s dissent
accused the majority of trampling on state policy interests, noting that the fed-
eral courts need to permit states the option to develop “their own methods for
enforcing the new federal rights.”41  Justice Stevens, who concurred and dis-
sented in Southland, observed that the California law at issue was “in a field
traditionally occupied by state law.”42
The Supreme Court’s decision in Volt represents a typical and appropriate
application of the obstacle preemption test.  There the parties agreed to arbitrate
in a standard form arbitration agreement used in a construction contract.
Included in this agreement was a sentence calling for the application of state
39 Moses, supra note 1, at 129-30; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 8-9 (describing Southland as
“plainly wrong” in interpreting congressional intent of the FAA).
40 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
41 Id. at 31-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (this dissenting opinion was joined by Justice
Rehnquist).
42 Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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law.  California law authorized local courts to enter stays of arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation that might preclude common issues of fact.  The
preemption argument contended that application of the state efficiency rule was
in conflict with the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA; enforcement of the stay
order would, in effect, prevent the arbitration from continuing.  In upholding
the stay of arbitration and refusing to find the local California procedural law to
be preempted, the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that state arbi-
tration law would be preempted only when it “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishments and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.”43  Rehnquist found the state law to be consistent with the FAA, reason-
ing that “[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of
procedural rules.”44  The local state arbitration procedures were characterized
as mere “state rules governing the conduct of arbitration.”45
Volt represents the high water mark of arbitration preemption cases.  It
employed the straightforward and normal obstacle test.  It was sensitive toward
state litigation policies that were found not to harm federal arbitration policy.
Volt described the California rules as “manifestly designed to encourage resort
to the arbitral process”46 and emphasized that the state rule at issue “generally
fostered the federal policy favoring arbitration.”47 Volt’s conventional preemp-
tion analysis made the effort to identify the policies underlying federal arbitra-
tion law and signaled that state laws relating to arbitration procedure would be
likely to survive preemption attack.48
It should be noted, however, that Volt failed to identify or discuss apparent
federalism values that were clearly relevant to the decision.  The Volt decision
could have emphasized the specific value of state laws that served to coordinate
inevitable litigation collaterally related to pending arbitration.  It did not. Volt
also could have generally acknowledged that state arbitration legislation pro-
vided value when it offered detailed procedures not addressed by a sparse FAA
largely devoid of procedural niceties.  The presence of efficient and gap-filling
state law demonstrated a sort of interactive federalism.  It did not.  California’s
regulation of collateral litigation, a realistic everyday fact of life in construction
arbitration, touched on a subject interconnected with the FAA’s call for the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.  This is the sort of interactive or inter-
connected style of federalism that permits concurrent regulatory collaboration
between state and federal governments.49
43 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
44 Id. at 476.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at n.5.
48 Id. at 476 (concluding that state law was consistent with federal policy “to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate”).
49 See Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2133 (2006) [hereinafter Schapiro, Stevens’s Interactive Federalism] (setting out
notion of interactive federalism as rooted in opinions of Justice Stevens); Robert A.
Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
2, on file with Nevada Law Journal) (asserting that the “key problem for federalism is not
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If the Volt decision represents a middling high-water mark of arbitration
federalism, Casarotto is its nadir.  There, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Montana law that mandated arbitration clauses to be underlined in all capital
letters and be placed at page one of a contract.  The reasoning of Justice Gins-
burg, writing for the majority, eschewed any reference to the obstacle approach
to assessing alleged Supremacy Clause issues of preemption.  Instead, it
quickly concluded that the Montana legislation was preempted by “singling out
arbitration provisions for suspect status.”50  Rather than look closely at the pol-
icies that support the federal and state laws at issue, the singling out test is a
shortcut that appears to look only for provisions of state law that purport to
regulate arbitration specifically.  In the methodology of the Casaratto decision,
once state law is deemed to “single out” arbitration for different treatment,
preemption seems to apply almost automatically.  Singling out analysis smacks
of a variety of per se illegality because of its conclusionary labeling and trun-
cated form of inquiry.51
If the Casarotto decision had applied the obstacle test rather than the “sin-
gling-out” alternative, there is a good chance that the case would have come out
differently.  Consider the purpose of the Montana law.  Montana’s legislation
seemed designed to increase the likelihood that signers of agreements contain-
ing arbitration clauses would understand that they had, indeed, contracted to
arbitrate.  This was legislation with the goal of pumping up the consent volume.
The important inquiry is whether such a provision was really in conflict with
the goals of the FAA.  An ordinary preemption analysis would have identified
the primary policy supporting the FAA to be that of enforcing agreements to
arbitrate.52  Congress passed the FAA to achieve enforcement of arbitration
agreements.  Montana’s legislation seems totally compatible with this simple
goal because it is designed to improve the odds for knowledgeable “agree-
ments” to arbitrate.  A state law intended to improve the consent process
appears compatible in purpose with a more general FAA, which seems
designed to enforce agreements to arbitrate.  In a phrase, it would be hard for
the signer to miss the arbitration clause under the Montana legislation at issue.
My primary criticism is that the style of preemption used in Casarotto is
unorthodox.  The truncated, unusual, and almost preemption per se analysis
used by the Casarotto majority is remarkable.  Careful attention to legislative
intent behind federal law is conspicuously missing.  The brevity of inquiry,
while commendable in the abstract, is lamentable.  The opinion lacks any rea-
soning describing why the obstacle approach fails to apply.
The Casarotto opinion also fails to discuss or even refer to federalism
values that might suffer because of the preemption holding.  Neither the word
separating state from federal power, but managing the overlap of state and federal law”).
See generally Schapiro, supra note 36.
50 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
51 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by “Facial Examination” of
Restraints:  The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1984) (tracing costs as well as benefits of a per se form of methodology).
52 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 111-14, 117-19, 139 (1992); Barbara
Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 61, 83-90 (1985) (attacking Southland as inconsistent with the legislative his-
tory of the FAA).
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“federalism” nor the precedent of Volt warrant a mention in the quick dash to a
decision in Casarotto. The presumption against federalism was ignored,
despite the fact that Montana’s sphere of regulation was that of contract law,
the quintessential subject traditionally left to state regulation and presumed to
be left to the states under normal tenets of federalism.53
My analysis of these arbitration preemption decisions is not based upon
advocating universal use of the ambiguous obstacle test.  The obstacle test has
been appropriately criticized for unnecessarily preempting valid state laws
because of its broad and muddled sweep.54  The obstacle branch of implied
conflict preemption is simply too ambiguous, and, because of its uncertainty,
risks improper incursions on federalism by overturning perfectly valid state
laws.55  Professor Nelson articulates a tighter, more precise preemption
approach that triggers the Supremacy Clause “if and only if state law contra-
dicts a valid rule established by federal law” and notes that “the mere fact that
federal law serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that it contra-
dicts everything that might get in the way of those purposes.”56  My use of the
obstacle test in attacking arbitration preemption doctrine is based only upon its
typical use and its inherent respect for at least some of the federalism values
that merit attention in any preemption context.  If the law were to shift in the
direction advocated by the set of constitutional law scholars cited in this para-
graph, there is no doubt that Casarotto would have been decided differently.
Several states that had legislation similar to that held preempted by the
Casarotto opinion have simply ignored the case and left their laws on the
books.  New York mandates that arbitration clauses in HMO contracts be
printed in at least 12-point boldface type and placed above the signature line.57
Until it was held to be preempted in 2005, Texas required that arbitration
clauses in personal injury contracts be signed by the attorneys of the con-
tracting parties.58
Whether such clauses are preempted may depend on the divide between
the Casarotto and Volt decisions.  Because such clauses improve the knowing
assent to arbitration, I believe that they advance the FAA’s primary goal, that
of enforcing real agreements to arbitrate.  Yet, these clauses are similar to the
Montana legislation found to be preempted per se in Casarotto.  There is no
53 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (observing that Congress may
legislate in areas traditionally left to the states but noting that “Congress does not exercise
[this power] lightly”).
54 See generally Nelson, supra, note 14, at 231-32, 278-90.
55 See Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?:  Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 833 (1995) (referring to obstacle
preemption as “largely ad hoc”); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws:
“Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1751 (1992) (noting that “today we cannot begin
to predict when preemption will occur”).
56 Nelson, supra note 14, at 231-32.  Professor Nelson advocates “a more particularized
inquiry into whether the relevant federal statute establishes a valid rule that contradicts state
law.” Id. at 290.
57 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-a (McKinney 2007).
58 See In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex. 2005) (holding
required attorney signature to be preempted because it adds an additional requirement to
arbitration and thereby inhibits enforceability).
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question that such clauses “single out” arbitration for separate treatment and,
for that reason, would be preempted under the unequal footing approach.
The “singling out” test is unworkable in some cases.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the existence of state legislation that makes it more difficult to vacate arbi-
tral awards by placing a time limit on when motions seeking vacatur can be
filed.  The FAA requires that such motions to vacate be filed in three months,59
but several states mandate earlier filings of motions to vacate.  These state laws
clearly single out arbitration for separate treatment from other processes of dis-
pute resolution.  Not surprisingly, however, caselaw has upheld such time limit
legislation, finding the time limits not in “conflict with the FAA’s ‘primary
purpose.’”60  If the singling out or unequal footing approach were consistently
used, many state arbitration laws that call for special treatment of arbitration
would be found preempted, despite the fact that such laws encourage arbitration
and make it a more attractive feature.
II. FEDERALISM VALUES SUFFER THROUGH DECISIONS THAT SUBORDINATE
APPLICATION OF STATE LAW TO ALLOCATION OF
LEGAL ISSUES TO THE ARBITRATOR
This part focuses not on arbitration preemption, the bastion of federalism
tension, but on the line of cases allocating the decision of various arbitration
issues to the arbitrator rather than a court.  Federalism policies can suffer from
insensitive tradeoffs in areas other than preemption and are presently being
ignored or cut back in a rush to increase the decisional authority of the arbitra-
tor.  Arbitrability decisions that assign legal questions to the arbitrator rather
than a judge result in state laws being found irrelevant to arbitration.
Recently I have written praising the trend to allocate decisional power to
the arbitrator.61  I regard this trend as advancing party autonomy, a crucial pol-
icy value underlying arbitration.  Disputants need to be empowered in many
ways and allowing them the authority to design arbitration procedures is an
important matter.  If the parties allocate specific duties to the arbitrator, courts
should normally defer to such explicit party choice and textual clarity, assum-
ing no contrary policy of greater import.  The arbitration disputants, in a sense,
own their own dispute, and efficiency dictates that they should have the power
to shape it intentionally.62  They have both the incentive and information to
59 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2000).
60 Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (using obstacle
test to hold that Connecticut’s 30 day limit for filing motion to vacate award is not pre-
empted by longer 90 day period of FAA); accord New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10
F. Supp. 2d 53, 59 (D. Mass. 1998) (upholding Massachusetts legislation requiring a motion
to vacate arbitration to be filed within 30 days of delivery of the award).
61 See BRUNET, SPEIDEL, STERNLIGHT & WARE, supra note 9, at 3-7 (emphasizing the value
in allocating substantial authority to the arbitration parties).
62 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical and Demo-
cratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (emphasizing own-
ership of dispute by the parties to the dispute themselves).
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make correct bilateral choices on such procedural matters.  Normally, party
choice or autonomy should not be disturbed.63
Arbitration operates in a contract model in which arbitration legislation
constitutes a set of default rules that apply only when the parties fail to legislate
the terms of arbitration.64  Numerous arbitration landmarks stress the decisional
powers of the parties to custom forge the terms of the conflict.  Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.65 interpreted the arbitration agreement to
empower the arbitrators to award punitive damages by reasoning that “parties
are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”66
Volt upheld the parties’ choice of California procedure by asserting that the
court’s role was to “ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced
according to their terms.”67 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan68 echoed
this theme by stating that “the basic objective in [the arbitration area] is . . . to
ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, ‘are
enforced according to their terms.’”69
Justice Stephen Breyer has articulated this party autonomy and arbitrator
authority theme in several arbitration opinions, including First Options of Chi-
cago and the plurality opinion in Bazzle. Careful analysis of Bazzle, however,
reveals a position that allows arbitrator power to trump important federalism
values and to do so with minimal concern for state law and policy.
In Bazzle, a plurality of the Supreme Court remanded to an arbitrator the
critical decision of whether to interpret the contract to permit class action arbi-
tration.  The decision stands as one allocating great power to the arbitrator and,
at the same time, diminishing the authority of the state courts to decide critical
issues of a legal nature.  As correctly interpreted by Professor Buckner, the
Bazzle decision “held that an arbitrator, not the court, should determine the
availability of classwide arbitration where the parties’ arbitration agreement is
silent on the issue.”70  At a time when the business and consumer law commu-
nities want a certain and predictable ruling on the legality of arbitrating class
actions, it seems surprising that the Bazzle decision would summarily bypass
broad state law application for an ad hoc decision by an arbitrator.
The most interesting thing about the important Bazzle decision may be its
failure to address the affront to the South Carolina Supreme Court.  After all,
the state’s highest court had already held that a class action in arbitration could
continue where the parties’ contract was silent regarding whether to permit
classwide arbitration and that, on the record, the arbitrator had properly used
63 See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (asserting that courts should uphold arbitration procedures set
forth in agreement except for “flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl”).
64 See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitra-
tion, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999); Ware, supra note 2.
65 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
66 Id. at 57 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
67 Volt, 489 U.S. at 479.
68 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
69 Id. at 947 (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 54).
70 Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration:  Arbitral
Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004).
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the class action procedure.  In allocating decisional power to the arbitrator, not
the court, Justice Breyer’s opinion simply ignores the diminished authority of
the states to set forth rules of procedure regulating arbitration.  This slight
toward state law is all the more real because of the silence of federal law
regarding class action arbitration.  Nothing in the FAA speaks to this issue.
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion makes this point when asserting that
“[t]here is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that precludes either of these
[class action arbitration] determinations [from being decided] by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina.”71
At the very least, the set of Bazzle opinions should have balanced the need
for the arbitrator to decide the propriety of the class action against the virtues of
allowing state power over arbitration procedures not addressed by the FAA.
One can imagine a high quality argument that the states should be able to regu-
late arbitration procedures, particularly where there appears no contrary intent
in the text of the FAA.  Indeed, proponents of the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act tout the Act’s comparatively detailed procedures as a reason to select it.72
The state arbitration acts offer sets of arbitration procedure far more detailed
than the minimal procedures set forth in the FAA, making state arbitration pro-
cedure a major selling point to informed counsel who draft arbitration clauses.
Moreover, the ability to initiate class actions in arbitration is more than
just a procedure.  The issue of whether to permit arbitration of classwide claims
is part of consumer protection regulation and contract law, traditionally the
domain of state law.73  This is a question where some degree of Supreme Court
respect or deference toward state law and consideration of a presumption
toward state law should have occurred.  Instead, the set of Bazzle opinions
summarily allocated the propriety of class treatment issue to the arbitrator with-
out examining the federalism tensions presented.74
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna75 also illustrates the trumping
of state consumer protection law development by allocating decisional power to
71 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454-55 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
72 See, e.g., Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 10, at 211 (asserting that state “[b]right line
rules can expedite the arbitration process . . . ”).
73 It might be argued that the Federal Trade Commission regulates consumer transactions
under the regulatory powers delegated by Congress in the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45 (2000) (creating F.T.C. and delegating task of regulating deceptive
practices to agency).  This, however, represents gap filling federal regulation that lacks effect
to preempt state consumer laws.  Some of the F.T.C.’s legislation and regulations provide an
example for what Professor Schapiro terms interactive federalism. See Schapiro, supra note
36; Schapiro, Stevens’s Interactive Federalism, supra note 49.  The Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act encourages manufacturers to settle consumer warranty claims through informal
settlement techniques.  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2000).  The states have created so called auto-
mobile lemon-law legislation to complement the federal law. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 198-a(k) (McKinney 2007) (allowing automobile purchaser to select binding arbitration of
lemon law claim); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.355 (2005) (making lemon law arbitration results
binding on the seller only).
74 For the argument that the Bazzle decision also usurps the powers of the state judiciaries,
see David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State
Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 553 (2004).
75 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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the arbitrator.  In Buckeye, the Supreme Court held that a challenge to contrac-
tual validity that attacks the contract as a whole should be decided by the arbi-
trator and not the court.76  Without any specific mention of federalism
implications, the Buckeye decision decided that claims of usury and Florida
lending and consumer law should not be allocated to the courts for decision,
but, instead, must go to the arbitrator.  Arbitrator decisions on such legal issues
are likely to be more discretionary and to rely less on legal doctrine than deci-
sions on such questions by the court.  Moreover, arbitrator decisions on these
legal attacks on a contract are unlikely to be transparent and to develop the
growth of the rule of law; they will usually not be included in a written award
and, accordingly, will be unavailable to the public.  Like many of the Court’s
modern arbitration opinions, Buckeye ignored any deference to state regulation
of lending and consumer transactions, matters traditionally left to the states.
Federalism analysis was, once again, lacking.
Defenders of Bazzle and other decisions that increase the power of the
arbitrator under the rationale of party autonomy will no doubt point out that the
courts will uphold a party choice of state arbitration law.  In this way, state
laws and policies relating to arbitration will apply in what I term a back door
manner.  While I acknowledge the appeal of this argument and laud the use of
party autonomy, it needs to be emphasized that only those attorneys well versed
in arbitration will have the expertise to take advantage of this option.  Because
most lawyers are unaware of the niceties of arbitration, state laws are likely to
only occasionally be selected.
CONCLUSION
I am certainly not the first to criticize the arbitration preemption decisions
of the Supreme Court.  Arbitration scholars have done a commendable job
picking apart the Court’s rewriting of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Professor
David Schwartz critiques the Court’s “federalism mistakes” and statutory con-
struction errors in his 2004 article.77  Professor Christopher Drahozal recog-
nizes the lack of a coherent doctrine in arbitration preemption decisions and
correctly highlighted the “notable absence” of the presumption against preemp-
tion in cases involving state contract principles.78  Professor Margaret Moses
criticizes the set of Supreme Court arbitration preemption decisions as a “major
intrusion upon the police powers of the states.”79  Professor Carole J. Buckner
writes that Bazzle empowers the parties to delegate to the arbitrator the author-
ity to decide purely procedural issues once thought to be the province of the
judge who would often use state law and concludes that this decision increases
federal powers.80
76 Id. at 446.  Justice Scalia’s opinion relied heavily upon the severability doctrine set forth
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See
generally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007).
77 Schwartz, supra note 1.
78 Drahozal, supra note 19, at 425.
79 Moses, supra note 1, at 132.
80 Buckner, supra note 70, at 304.
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An amended FAA would specifically articulate no intent to preempt the
field of arbitration.  No serious proposal to eliminate state arbitration laws
exists.  Much of my criticism lies with the style of preemption analysis
employed by the Supreme Court.  With minimal explanation, the Supreme
Court’s puzzling Casarotto decision abandoned the orthodox obstacle test and
replaced it with a type of per se approach that automatically calls for preemp-
tion provided that state law “singles out” arbitration for special treatment.  Pro-
fessor David Schwartz has referred to the Court’s federalism mistakes.81  My
critique laments the lack of any sensitivity toward state laws or candid discus-
sion of federalism in Supreme Court arbitration decisions.  The fact that the
word federalism has been avoided or ignored by the majorities in the set of
arbitration preemption decisions needs to be considered a tragic case of the lack
of respect and comity toward state law.
The recent allocation of greater decisional power to the arbitrator also
trumps the power of state courts and state rules of law.  Arbitrators are now free
to apply their own brand of procedures, which can ignore state law of the seat
of arbitration.  Meaningful judicial review of these decisional choices by arbi-
trators is almost non-existent.  In the rush to create a judge-made powerful fed-
eral arbitration law, the Court has once more relegated state law to an
unnecessarily narrow and secondary status and left its application to those cli-
ents lucky enough to have an attorney able to counsel a difficult opt-in to state
arbitration procedure.  True, state arbitration law can be selected by the parties
and will gain acceptance through this sort of “back door” process.  Yet, state
arbitration laws, together with related federalism values, are too important to be
limited in application to purely intrastate applications and the opt-in, back door
context.  The passionate affection for federal arbitration and party autonomy,
while sensible in the vague abstract, appears to frustrate application of modern
and innovative state laws that should be presumed to be valid.
81 Schwartz, supra note 1.
